This paper comments on selected problems of the definition of linguistic pragmatics with a focus on notions associated with speech act theory in the tradition of John Langshaw Austin. In more detail it concentrates on the (ir)relevance of the use of the Austinian categorisation into locution, illocution, and perlocution in locating a divide in between pragmatics and semantics, and especially the distinction between the locutionary act and the illocutionary act and its implications for the definition of pragmatics and its separation from the semantic theory. The relation between form and meaning is further briefly reviewed against dichotomies including the Gricean and neo-Gricean 'what is said' versus 'what is implicated' or meant, between what can be 'locuted', but not said, and what can be said, but not asserted. These dichotomies are related to the theoretical commitments as to the accepted operative forces in speech acts, primarily convention and intention. It is suggested that, roughly, the development of the speech act theory can be viewed as a process by which the theory moves away from its originally sociolinguistic orientation towards a more psychologistic account, which in turn leads towards diminishing the role of (traditional) semantics and the subsequent juxtaposition of pragmatics and syntax rather than pragmatics and semantics.
Introduction -formulations of pragmatics
Since the time Morris (1938) identified pragmatics as a research area complementary to syntax and semantics its scope has been explicitly disputed among linguists and philosophers of language. Within this debate speech acts have been in the centre of interest, while speech act theory in the Austinian tradition and its further elaborations have been typically recognised as the most salient, uncontroversially pragmatic research area.
Morris's division -the classical view
Charles Morris was the first to use the term pragmatics in a rather systematic technical way, but the problems which must have motivated him were not new. As is well known, in his attempt to structure the field of semiotics, Morris identified three main branches: 1) syntactics (today's 'syntax') -the study of the structural "formal relation of signs to one another"; 2) semantics -the study of "the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable"; 3) pragmatics -the study of the contextual "relation of signs to interpreters" (cf. Morris 1938: 6f.) . Although Morris's ambitious agenda to integrate all sciences of signs, whether linguistic or not, was never to be accomplished, his work evidently paved the path for pragmatic research, however modified and limited in comparison to what he had envisaged 1 . Functional as they are, the categories suggested by Morris are not absolutely complementary and even in today's perspective the three areas are still underspecified bones of contention to the effect that, as can be seen in subsequent discussion, there have been suggestions to dispose with either pragmatics or semantics on grounds that the co-existence of the two introduces confusion detrimental to clarity of linguistic research.
Further formulations
Since Morris many new formulations of pragmatics have been suggested, most of which have concentrated on the issue of truth-conditions. This focus on linguistics as a field whose main interest transcends the traditional (at least until the mid-20 th century) interest in language as a means of describing the world provides a linking thread through many otherwise diverse definitions of pragmatics and integrates varied speech act theoretic research.
Most definitions of pragmatics use the notion of a speech act or a linguistic act, even if this reference is not directly associated with the theory of speech acts. To mention just a few, Stalnaker (1972) defines pragmatics as the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they appear, limiting semantics to the study of propositions; Katz (1977: 14) also decides to limit semantics to the study of information available in e.g. an anonymous letter situation, maximally free of particularised context. Gazdar (1979: 2) in his much quoted formula claims that "Pragmatics = Meaning minus truth conditions" and Levinson subsumed methodological attempts at defining pragmatics by claiming that the most promising are the definitions that equate pragmatics with 'meaning minus semantics', or with a theory of language understanding that takes context into account, in order to complement the contribution that semantics makes to meaning. (Levinson, 1983: 32) In other words, sentences should provide (semantic) input, which is further analysed in contextualised pragmatic studies, which in speech act-theoretic research may be related to the juxtaposition of form and function, and consequently, roughly, to the concept of locution vis-à-vis illocution. It should suggest that the concept of illocution is in the centre of pragmatic research, being focused on what people do and (attempt to) achieve in what they say. Extending this view leads to the understanding of pragmatics in, among others, Verschueren's sense, i.e. as a perspective on language use, an interest in the relation between form and its effective use (e.g. Verschueren 1999 ). This in turn leads to pragmatics controlling all aspects of meaning which focus on functional communicative use (from phonetics to discourse and beyond).
Speech act theoretic-oriented researchers (e.g. Barker 2004 Barker , 2007 , as in fact many others 2 , understand semantics as the study of propositional content, while pragmatics as the study of speech acts in broad communicative structures. It is also often acknowledged that a semantic input of "what is said" forms the basis for a pragmatic analysis, which focuses on what is done beyond and by saying.
Criticism of the relevance of SAT in the pragmatic program
It is worth noting though that the reign of the theory of speech acts in pragmatics is not absolute. For instance, Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, relevance theorists, have questioned the value of the theory of speech acts in the pragmatic program (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 243 ff.) , claiming that although the speech act approach to utterances is perhaps the most uncontroversial assumption of modern pragmatics […] the vast range of data that speech act theorists have been concerned with is of no special interest to pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson 1986 /1995 .
Sperber and Wilson claim that the assignment of a speech act type is not crucial in comprehension or interpretation of utterances, both on the level of explicature and implicature and argue that classification in terms of speech acts plays a minor (if any) role in such comprehension and interpretation 3 . As inferential processes and ostensive communication 4 are central issues in the neo-Gricean relevance theory, the theory of speech acts is seen as practical only on the level of mood analysis and possibly universal abstract categories, such as "saying", "telling", and "asking", which can be described with the use of the speech act theoretic apparatus and for which "type" recognition is an essential part of the comprehension process.
Critical remarks of this kind bring to the foreground the most contentious issues in the speech act theory itself, which are many, e.g. the status and architecture of speech act taxonomies, the definition of the speech act and its components or aspects, the status of uptake, the nature of convention and its status vis-à-vis intention 5 , the salience of the institutional aspect, the divide between the institutional and the non-institutional, the source of the illocutionary force. The 3 One of the examples evoked is an analogy of tennis, which can be played/performed (sic!) without players knowing theoretical terms (Sperber & Wilson 1986 /1995 . 4 Types which, according to Sperber & Wilson, need to be ostensively communicated and recognized include e.g. promising, ordering, thanking, bidding, but others, such as predicting, denying, claiming, or even warning, do not require any special pragmatic tools to be interpreted and successfully performed; they do not need to be ostensively communicated. 5 The evolution of the theory of speech act can in fact be seen as a struggle between the convention-based and the intention-based approaches; the tension originating from the time of Peter Strawson's (1964) article "Intention and convention in speech acts" tripartite approach to the speech acts through its three (allegedly) distinct aspects, viz. locution, illocution, and perlocution, rejected in the relevance-theoretic framework and discussed in this paper, is one of the focal contentious issues.
Locution, illocution, and perlocution -the Austinian perspective
The assumption lying at the core of speech act theory is that any utterance has two basic aspects: it involves sense and force. The distinction is easily traced back to Frege, who was the first to comment on it with reference to grammatical mood. This distinction also evokes Austin's (1962 Austin's ( /1975 1960) reflection on the nature of language as a means to perform action. Austin also found it relevant to differentiate between three aspects of an utterance, corresponding roughly to its form, function, and effect/result.
Although notoriously underspecified, Austin's tripartite division of a speech act into locution, illocution and perlocution has been widely accepted in linguistics and served as a guideline for demarcating semantics and pragmatics. Evidently, both the function and the effect of an utterance are explicitly pragmatic in nature, but for locating the borders of pragmatics, the divide between locution and illocution is especially important.
In his attempt to thoroughly account for the nature of the speech act Austin (19621975: 92f.) defines locution as composed of three elements, viz.:
1. Phonetic act (uttering certain noises) → a phone 2. Phatic act (uttering certain words in a certain construction, i.e. noises of certain type) → a pheme 3. Rhetic act (performance of a pheme with a more or less definite sense and a more or less definite reference, where sense + reference are equivalent to "meaning") → a rheme The description, typically of Austin, is ambiguous and only indicates that the overall locution should be (roughly) understood as 'literal', semantic, a maximally decontextualised vehicle of meaning. In Austin's words it amounts to "saying something", which in turn is: the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 .
In contrast, illocution corresponds to the function (or force) of an utterance. Austin also explicitly admits that one locution may be used to perform many different illocutions (possibly at a time), whose force comes from (again a notoriously underspecified) convention (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 6 . The basic difference between illocution and perlocution is that the illocutionary act is performed in uttering words, while the perlocutionary by the utterance. It suggests that there should be a conventional bond between the expression and its illocution, which is stronger than the bond between the locution and the corresponding perlocution.
The definition of perlocution is a broad one and focuses on the results that the act produces. In Austin's words, it is defined as follows:
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them […] We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 'perlocutionary' act. (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 In short, Austin identified locution, illocution, and perlocution within the speech act as acts done "of saying", "in saying", and "by saying", respectively. He illustrated the three aspects of the speech act with the following examples cited after Austin (1962 Austin ( /1975 as (1) Evidently, having accepted Morris's premise that pragmatics focuses on the relation between linguistic signs and their users, it should hold that locution is associated with abstract, (maximally) decontextualised meaning which can be accessed out of context. In other words, locution should be accessible without information on the context of use with its meaning (at least relatively) stable across different contexts.
Illocution in turn stands for the (intended) function of an utterance, i.e. in uttering/producing locution, the speaker performs an act of a certain kind and this act is done "in" saying; the produced effects, whether envisaged by the speaker or not, belong to perlocution and are performed "by" saying certain words.
For Austin, the illocutionary force arises beyond words and has its roots in convention. Once more, Austin's lecture notes leave little theory on the nature of such a convention, but it seems reasonable to believe that he referred to a kind of shared knowledge with regard to the relation of form and meaning of the expression in question (possibly together with contextual clues). Further theorizing on speech acts resulted in the introduction of the notion of an illocutionary force indicating device (IFID), whose many forms 7 are indicative of the special and diverse nature of communicative conventions.
It follows that locution should belong in semantics as it is closely bound to the form and invites a search for explicitness in that form. As illocution is mainly a level of assigning categorial belonging, where performative verbs are often used as labels for functional classes, it should be perceived as "pragmatic"; it is associated with meaning "beyond words", beyond the rhetic act, a meaning derived from varied conventions. Perlocution, focused on envisaged effects, should be purely pragmatic in nature.
However, this categorisation is by no means simple and reveals numerous problems. First of all, it is evident that locution "invites" illocution and its interpretation requires inferential processes which are inherently pragmatic in nature. What differentiated performative utterances from purely descriptive ones, according to Austin (at least when he started the theory) was their "misleading" form, their being "masqueraders", whose outward appearance often dramatically departed from the canonical 8 form suggested later, but also their being performative in disguise of descriptivity. In other words, the "literal meaning" of an expression is not its "real meaning" in many, in fact most cases in linguistic communication. If the locutionary aspect of a speech act is to be discussed (semantically) in isolation, it is at the expense of its true meaning. This does not translate into that the form is not important in communication, but it is clear that understanding the "literal" is only part of the comprehension process and is simply not enough for communication.
Illocution, a "theoretical tier" devoted to analysis in terms of metalinguistic categories cannot be separated from the other two aspects either. Austin indicated that illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel; for example an order invites obedience, while a promise invites fulfillment. This description to some extent resembles his account of perlocutionary acts, which involve either some kind of achievement of a perlocutionary object (e.g. convincing someone or persuading) or a "perlocutionary sequel", e.g. a warning may result in alerting someone. The "in saying"/"by saying" distinction, as introduced by Austin in his first lectures, is thus rather unclear, e.g. the consequential effects of "promise" are under illocution, while those for "persuade" and "protest" are under perlocution. Evidently, there is a good reason to acknowledge the difference, and the nature of promising is in a way "more internal" than that of e.g. persuading, but the theoretical apparatus employed does not seem efficient enough to clearly categorise performative aspects of utterances. It is as if Austin was able to locate many important phenomena associated with performativity, but left them at the stage of early theoretical development, for further refinement in the future.
Already in 1977, Allwood pointed to the fact that also the nature of convention that Austin might have had in mind varies with the verbs used in particular utterances. For example, for (2) below:
(2) It is snowing it is relatively easy to conclude that the locutionary aspect "says something about the weather", while the illocutionary involves the utterance force as a statement 9 . However, the picture gets more complex and complicated in the case of explicit performatives as (3) below:
(3) I promise to buy you a drink.
use of the pronoun I, presence of a performative verb, presence (or possibility of inclusion) of the adverb hereby, present tense, simple aspect, and non-negative form. 9 Although this statement may also, of course, be used to perform different illocutionary acts, e.g. it may be used as a warning, an invitation to go out, an invitation to stay indoors, an expression of surprise or satisfaction, and indeed in many other ways.
The illocutionary force in such utterances seems to arise at least partly from the meaning of the verb, thus its nature (however conventional) is profoundly different from the force associated with (2). For (3) both the fact that the verb "promise" is used and the form of the utterance as a statement are important. Although the meaning of (3) can vary across contexts, at least part of this meaning, in the sense of function, is construed thanks to the convention associated with the verb "promise", i.e. input on the locutionary level. This varying degree of "lexical meaning" intervention is a good indication that the illocutionary level dependence on the locutionary, together with other elements of context, is much varied and does not allow for a clear description of illocution (or locution) as a consistent category. In many contexts the lexical (locutionary) content of utterances functions as a trigger for understanding the illocutionary force, cf. (4) and (5) below: (4) "I do" (5) "Two no trumps"
In such cases the locutionary element is important but its reading crucially depends on extralinguistic context. In other cases, elaborate locution secures the "proper" reception of the force, as e.g. in the case of legal documents exercising a real performative force in a relevant legal culture.
Legal language itself provides many interesting examples for analysis in the speech act-theoretic framework, highlighting many of its problems, including the problem of reliance on form. First of all, it opens a whole realm of contexts, from formulaic expressions of the courtroom through carefully designed verbose language of legal documents to fairly informal client-lawyer consultations, but even if only the most explicit language of legal documents is taken into consideration, the nature of the illocutionary force remains an evasive one. Among others, it shows that the difference between the institutional and non-institutional, or institutionally conventional and just linguistically conventional is not an easy one. For example, should the text of the Decree on Martial Law passed in Poland in 1981 10 as performed by the Polish Piwnica pod Baranami cabaret group be excluded altogether from analysis? Being a kind of (artistic) performance, it must be defined as a non-communicative type of linguistic action. However, its use may serve (and did indeed serve in the past) many different purposes, some of which seem communicative, e.g. communicating judgement on the party in power, building rapport among people, communicating reassurance, ridiculing the hostile. One may argue that these "functions" are of perlocutionary nature, but their status clearly depends on theoretical commitments. If what makes a speech act communicative is the speaker's intention to convey some content (as many researchers argue should be the case, e.g. Bach and Harnish 1979), it should follow that whether an artistic performance, reciting of a poem, or uttering the christening formula, is a communicative act or not depends on the speaker's state of mind. Much like a secret code, the act may carry different illocutionary forces (if any at all) for different audiences, according to the speaker's plan; it also may result in different perlocutionary effects just because it may activate different contextual traits for different people. As it is clearly not possible to build an all-inclusive theory of speech acts which should explain all communicative phenomena, the architecture of the theory must depend on the researcher's commitment. Bach and Harnish (1979) decided to exclude conventional speech acts from their analysis and concentrated on building a theory of unambiguously communicative ones. Other theorists, typically more sociology-oriented, such as Butler (e.g. 1993 Butler (e.g. , 2997 and Hornsby (e.g. 2000) , decided to concentrate on a very general nature of linguistic action, viz. its performative character, the ability to modify, maintain, and create extralinguistic reality. Millikan (e.g. 2005) , although much different in her scientific commitments, is a further example of focus on performativity without minute bottom-up investigations and clear-cut taxonomies. Such analyses, although dramatically diverse, all explicitly subscribe to the Austinian heritage with simultaneous disregard of at least some aspects of the tripartite distinction and tacit promotion of the holistic "illocutionary" perspective.
In the context of the role of pragmatics, an interesting side effect of such approaches can be seen in Hornsby's (2000) claim that "semantics" (and traditional philosophy of language) as a research area defined over the past is typically malegoverned and anti-feministic even in its approach to research. The main point in this criticism is relevant in the speech act-theoretic discussion as it is claimed that the feminine view is more holistic, while it is a natural male tendency to dissect and classify. Incidentally, Borg (2004: 12f.) expresses a related view (although with no feminist implications) with regard to the semantics-pragmatics divide. She separates the two disciplines along the lines of reasoning where semantics is seen as "modular" and "formal", while pragmatics, focused on processes of communication, necessarily "global" and as "informationally unencapsulated" as possible (Borg 2004: 90) . Leaving the basis for the gender differences aside, this view of the distinction still seems a rather important trait for navigation among diverse speech act theories and perception of a certain downplay of the role of locution in many approaches. It also sounds as a comeback to Austin's original reflection, being an explicit acknowledgement of the variety of situations where speaking is doing under many disguises.
Returning to perlocution alone, the category merges with the "illocutionary" not only through metalinguistic illocutionary labels, but also in e.g. the analysis of "perlocutionary verbs", i.e. verbs describing (potential or actual) effects of linguistic action (cf. e.g. apologise, welcome, thank, entice, congratulate). Some such verbs, especially expressives are as if a link between illocution and perlocution in that although they are typically used in direct performatives (I thank …, Let me apologise …), they at the same time "describe" (intended) perlocutionary effects. Thus, it may often be practical to use a perlocutionary perspective on the whole of the speech act. For example, Kalisz (1993: 33) suggested that politeness principles formulated by Robin Lakoff and Leech should be integrated in research on perlocutionary acts, as being intended, target-and addressee-oriented, they are more relevant on the level of perlocution than illocution.
In many cases there is a distinction which could approximately be identified with reference to conventional consequences on the one hand, and real, often not directly foreseeable effects on the other. This distinction, however, does not map systematically onto the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects either.
Austin himself realized that his categorization may produce problems and mentioned the possibility of a terminological confusion, which we could dub metalinguistic. For example, he explicitly admitted that:
The expression 'meaning' & 'use of sentence' can blur the distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary acts […;] to speak of the 'use' of language can […] blur the distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 He further referred to the concept of "the use" of language (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 to show that while "arguing" and "warning" are roughly conventional and could be successfully used in explicit performative formulae (in the "in doing x" mode), concepts (and verbs corresponding to them) such as "persuading", "alarming", and "insinuating" are different in that they are not used in explicit performatives and describe effects rather than acts (in the "by doing x" mode). This remark is consistent with the discussion above, which indicates the need for analysis of "perlocutionary verbs", an analysis which, in turn, is naturally very "semantic" in nature.
Austin's acknowledgement of the methodological difficulty is a good indication, a reaffirmation indeed, that he was skeptical with regard to the construction of a thorough theory of speech acts (or linguistic meaning). It is evident that his theory is better seen as a construct which points to (partly) systematic communicative (rather than only linguistic) phenomena, which had been neglected prior to his formulation of the theory 11 . In this light the division into 11 Cf. "We must learn to run before we can walk. If we never made mistakes how should we correct them?" (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 and the very first words of William James lectures published as How to Do Things with Words: "What I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is that of being true, at locution, illocution, and perlocution, just like the division into semantics and pragmatics, is better seen as reflective of emphasis on specific aspects in linguistic communication, and not an attempt at dissecting analysis of speech acts into mutually exclusive areas.
Alternative accounts of the internal structure of the speech act and their implications for a definition of pragmatics
Dissatisfaction with (often distorted) Austin's model resulted in alternative proposals as to the internal structure of the speech act and the status of its component parts or aspects. The most salient characteristics of selected competing accounts are briefly sketched below.
Searle's theory of speech acts
In his elaboration of the theory of speech act, Searle (1969 Searle ( , 1979 ) rejected Austin's category of locution altogether. His main criticism of the category was based on the fact that locutionary acts could not be sufficiently differentiated from illocutionary acts of saying. Slightly disregarding the fact that Austin meant all three categories, i.e. locution, illocution, and perlocution, to be aspects of one act rather than distinct acts, Searle's suggestion may clearly be perceived as yet another attempt to put forward a more precise description of the nature of the speech act.
Among constituents of speech acts Searle mentions "performing utterance acts", i.e. uttering words, "performing propositional acts", i.e. referring and predicating, "performing illocutionary acts", e.g. stating, commanding, and finally performing perlocutionary acts, i.e. consequences or effects (Searle 1969: 24-5) . It seems that in suggesting his architecture, Searle renamed Austin's phonetic and phatic acts as "utterance", and turned the rhetic act into the "propositional" one, possibly blurring some aspects of the Austinian phatic act into both new categories. In Searle's version of speech act theory, the act is primarily accounted for in terms of the propositional content conditions and the illocutionary point. Searle also reintroduces Austin's classification of speech acts with some amendments and discusses the types in terms of abstract categories. least in parts. The phenomenon to be discussed is very widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been already noticed, at least here and there, but I have not found attention paid to it specifically" (Austin 1962 (Austin /1975 .
Being a philosopher of language, Searle is not directly interested in the scope of pragmatic research, but his theory treated as data may be important for a demarcation of pragmatics.
First of all, the conditions set for successful accomplishment of an act, conditions which are an integral part of his theory, are a mixture of (traditionally) semantic and pragmatic notions. They make use of both lexical meaning of the performative verb in question (if present), or a label accepted for the category, and elements of context important for successfulness of the act. In Speech Acts (1969), Searle just sketches conditions for the types of act and gives only one full account of an act, viz. description of the act of promising constituting Chapter 3. The conditions envisaged for an act to be a promise include, among others, expressing a proposition, both the speaker's and hearer's attitudes, the speaker's sincere intention to act, as well as the speaker's intention to accept the obligation to act. In summary, it is not possible to divide semantic and pragmatic aspects in Searle's theory. The distinctions within the internal structure of the act may be used, but separation of the "utterance act" plus the "propositional act" from the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act produces similar difficulties as the Austinian distinction into locution, illocution, and perlocution. In Searle, these difficulties are even reinforced by the presence of conditions which mix lexical knowledge with world knowledge, linguistic considerations with context intervention.
It is also noteworthy in the context that Searle (1969) explicitly states that the theory of speech acts is a theory of linguistic competence and not performance, i.e. in deSaussurean terms it is langue that is the object of research of the theory of speech act, not parole. Searle's claim shows his belief that the theory of speech acts is "possible" as a (probably) universal theory of linguistic action; it also shows that pragmatics, insofar as Searle can be seen as a pragmatician, can be "formal".
What is said vs. what is meant
One of the most widespread views on the semantics-pragmatics divide is associated with Paul H. Grice and his notions of "what is said" as opposed to "what is implicated". Despite some bias towards literality, Searle explicitly subscribes to the Gricean school (e.g. Searle 1969: 43f.) and in many respects, although not a speech act theorist, Grice can be seen as development on Austinian ideas in that he tried to systematise the mechanisms of successful communication and his research has exerted strong influence on the developments in the speech act theory, strengthening especially its inferential, intention-based (as opposed to conventionbased) mainstream.
It may appear that the Gricean distinction between "what is said" and "what is meant" should correspond to the Austinian notions of locution and illocution (possibly enriched with perlocution), thus lending a reliable criterion for the semantics-pragmatics borderline. For Grice the meaning of an utterance, i.e. what is implicated and meant, arises not so much from the form, i.e. "what is said" (which seems to correspond to Austin's locutionary acts performed "in saying"), but is brought about "by the saying of what is said" and "putting it that way" (cf. Grice 1989: 39f.), which in turn seem close to the Austinian illocution 12 . However, a closer look at processes involved at the level of "what is said" or (here) locution proves that it also involves typically pragmatic phenomena. Even apparently explicit utterances, such as Austin's examples quoted above and (6) below, (6) I name this ship the Queen Elisabeth require typically pragmatic processes. For example, an interpretation of (6) and the expressions "Shoot her" and "You can't do that", quoted in (1) all require processes of assigning reference to deictic expressions, and disambiguation of superficially explicit forms. Forms such as (7) below, although superficially explicit, can only be interpreted in context.
(7) Coffee would keep me awake Whether (7) is to be taken as "yes" or "no" in response to an offer of a cup of coffee does not depend on the "semantic" meaning of its component parts or even whether it can be understood as a sentence, but has roots in extralinguistic context. Other much quoted examples which show context sensitivity of meaning and the non-independence of truth-theoretic semantics include e.g.:
(8) It is raining (9) He is too old.
Even within maximally (minimalist) semantic approaches, the assignment of the truth value to the sentences above requires not only assigning reference, but extralinguistic knowledge (e.g. information on the place of reference for (8); type of activity for (9)).
Literature from the areas of pragmatics, semantics, and philosophy of language provides many examples and ample evidence for the fact that "semantic" content always underdetermines speaker meaning (cf. e.g. Bach 2001 , Carston 2002 , 2008 . Although using different categories and names (e.g. "semantic enrichment", Gricean particularised and generalised implicature, "non-literal" readings, e.g. related to humour, irony and sarcasm, "polite" indirectness, "default" meaning, etc.), the accounts of phenomena associated with underdeterminacy of linguistic expressions share interest in the nature of meaning and the mysterious ways in which meaning can be conveyed in context.
It follows that the locution-illocution/perlocution divide does not provide means for posing the semantics-pragmatics distinction; the distinction cannot be systematically mapped onto the relation between "what is said" and "what is implicated" either. The problem seems to invite conclusion that there is no clear semantics-pragmatics distinction at all, which in turn may be an invitation to dispose of either of the concepts.
What is locuted vs. what is said
There are theorists who tried to refine both the Austinian distinctions and the problems invited by the locution-illocution-perlocution issue. For example, Korta and Perry (2007) suggest that locution is a practical notion, but needs further subcategorisation or amendment as it is easy to show the difference between "what is locuted" and "what is said". In their account, it seems, locution corresponds to dictionary, semantic, explicit meaning, while the notion of "what is said" (contrary to Grice) to what can be identified roughly with hearer meaning.
Korta and Perry argue that locution can be, and in fact often is, identified with "what is said" or the propositional content in the sense of Searle, but only in cases of successful communication. The cases of 'non-successful' (or less successful) communication in which the difference between "what is locuted" and "what is said" is clearly visible include e.g. undetected (but also conveyed) irony, instances of embedded propositions, unexpected interpretation on the part of the audience with a subsequent clash between speaker meaning and hearer meaning.
It seems that Korta and Perry's main argument translates into that "what is said" bears kinship relationship to illocution, and is especially closely related to assertion; that it is "a forensic concept" in that speaker can be taken responsible for "what was said" (rather than intended), and that it is also characterised by sensitivity to information speaker wants to convey. In short, the argument seems to be that "what is said" can (dramatically) transcend referential meaning. For example, (7) Aristotle enjoyed philosophy can be "locuted" about Aristotle, the Greek philosopher, while "said" (i.e. interpreted as referring to) e.g. Aristotle Onassis in certain contexts (cf. Korta and Perry 2007: 176 f.) . In a similar manner in (somewhat obsolete already) (8) below, (8) If Hillary is elected, Bill will enjoy his return to the White House.
neither of the propositions 'Hillary being elected' and 'Bill enjoying his return to the White House' is "said" or "asserted"; they are merely "locuted". In (9), (9) John is turning red the speaker's intention may be "literal", i.e. to suggest that e.g. John's face is turning red in colour, but the audience's interpretation may be that John is becoming a Communist, for which judgement the speaker may be believed "responsible".
In all these examples there is a clash between "what is locuted" and "what is said" in the sense of communicated, and sometimes "what is locuted" may be understood in a way that the speaker neither envisaged, nor intended.
Applying Perry's (2001) reflexive-referential theory (RRT), Korta and Perry (2007) do defend the notion of a "locutionary act" with the provision that it should be broken down into further aspects, especially into "intended" reflexive locutionary content and the actual locutionary content, i.e. its reception in context. A side effect of their account is attention drawn to a kind of "uptake", a notion considered by Austin and corresponding to recognition (whether "correct" or false) of the speaker's communicative intention on the part of the audience 13 , which, however, was originally introduced as a proof for an illocutionary act. As Korta and Perry (2007: 175) claim about natural communication:
our ordinary concept of what is said is to some extent responsive to uptake on the part of the audience […] What is said seems to have both illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects It is evident that Korta and Perry's concept of "what is said" is by no means "semantic" in that it refers directly to typically pragmatic aspects of highly 13 The problem of uptake and its status in the theory of speech acts is also relevant for defining the scope of pragmatics and the semantics-pragmatics distinction. In the (more) convention-based theories, an uptake is usually seen as a necessary element for there being an illocutionary act at all. In theories focused on intention, uptake, if important, can be found in considerations on the "intended" nature of the act, i.e. what the speaker intends to perform or her envisaged effects on the hearer and the world (cf. also Sbisà 2009, this volume) . contextualised meaning. For them, locution seems to be a kind of (possibly semantic) template for meaning derived in context. In this way they combine in "what is said" all aspects of contextualised reading of a linguistic expression, elements which others dub as "semantic enrichment", implicature, default meaning, etc., notions troublesome for the distinction between "what is said" and "what is meant" as discussed above. A direct consequence of allowing such phenomena into the Austinian locution is that the concept can by no means be identified as purely semantic. Thus, on Korta and Perry's account locution not only invites but also incorporates "pragmatic" meaning, which further does not allow for a simple use of the concept in identification of the semantics-pragmatics divide. It seems that if such a divide were to be suggested at all, it should be hidden somewhere not even between "what is locuted" and "what is said", but rather in between the intended reflexive locutionary content (possibly inside the speaker's mind) and the actual locutionary content, which seems to be open to largely unrestricted enrichments.
It is noteworthy that often language researchers use the concept of "what is said" with the meaning which Korta and Perry render as "what is locuted". It is "what is said" (mainly of course in Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean theories and approaches) that corresponds to "general", "literal" meaning, while Korta and Perry's " Although typically speech act accounts make use of the label "Assertion", "Assertoric", or "Assertive"
16
, as a cover term for a (more descriptive) speech act type, it seems that the category of assertion is of a special kind in that it permeates all discourse and in that sense can be at least an element or aspect of all other (illocutionary) acts.
14 Similar examples of non-literal meaning with elements of conscious deception (silent disclaimers) on the part of the speaker are discussed with reference to "what is said" (equivalent to "locuted" as used in Korta and Perry) and "what is communicated" (equivalent to Korta and Perry's " what is said") in Horn 2006. 15 But see Searle (1969 141f.) for a discussion of the assertion fallacy, which exposes (and criticises) the widespread view that the content of an assertion can be derived from the semantic value of the words which compose the utterance in question. 16 Cf. e.g. Stalnaker 1978 , Searle's (1979 collection.
Conclusions
Although the theory of speech acts paved a way for pragmatic research building it on the basis of prior semantic interests, its categories and principles are not sufficient for demarcating the borderline for pragmatics, especially if it is to be found vis-à-vis semantics. The pragmatic perspective manifests itself as a heavyhanded one, to use Stephen Neale's (2007) phrase, which permeates all levels of linguistic analysis. This should not be surprising as linguistic activity is necessarily a purposeful one and easily lends itself to functional research. There is a temptation thus to conceive of pragmatics as a perspective on language in use, a perspective which tends towards hegemony over other approaches to language, growing in dominance over not only semantics, but also e.g. phonetics and phonology, morphology, etc. It seems that the strongest relative to pragmatic research can be seen in the mediating syntax (cf. Barker 2004 , Carston 2008 , and incidentally newer approaches within generative grammar) 17 , which is not surprising either as the relationship between these two areas has direct resemblance to the wellestablished relation between form and meaning. This approach leaves the contentious problem of where semantics ends and pragmatics begins (and vice versa) outside (or on the outskirts of) the linguistic theory.
In a much philosophical manner, Austin was rather sceptical as to the possibility of constructing a clear theory of linguistic communication. It seems he was more concerned with pointing to the contemporary theoretical inadequacies and negligence with respect to non-truth evaluable expressions. Bringing to light ordinary language and its nature was the revolution that he had envisaged and, as can be seen in his lectures, was evidently proud to introduce. Although he did not use the term pragmatics, his work has evidently proved seminal in the development of the field.
Speech act theory (or rather contemporary theories) shows that there are no clear cut borders related to meaning, no absolute categories; that we need to be satisfied with non-completion and openness, and eventually with what can be seen as "the magic of pragmatics" (Neale 2007) . This "magic" evidently is a linking thread through all speech act theoretic research and in fact all research concentrated on linguistic meaning. Whether it is concluded that the force of an 17 But cf. Kearns (2006) , focusing on illocutionary logic and assertive conditionals, who claims that a sharp distinction can be seen between syntax and semantics, which in turn is blurred with pragmatics. It is evident that what he means correlates with authors such as Barker (2004) or (less decisively) Carston (2008) , who give prominence to the notion of pragmatics 17 . By the author's own admission, illocutionary force is in this account part of the semantic structure with syntax providing "clues" for semantic interpretation. Even in this approach one form can be used to perform many different acts, i.e. acts with different semantic structures, depending on the context.
